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THE NEWS AND THE ACCUSED
by Lawrence W. Schad*
I. Introduction
Any American accused of a criminal offense is guaranteed by
constitutional mandate "the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury.. ."1 [Emphasis added]. Yet the maintenance of
the requisite impartiality is a difficult task for jurors confronted
with newspaper headlines such as "DEATH QUIZ YIELDS
BEATING CONFESSION, ADMITS ATTACK ON COED,
LINK PAROLEE TO SECOND CRIME." 2 Such sensational
news releases underscore the danger of potential interference
with the accused's right to a trial by an impartial jury.3 This type
of reporting has stimulated extensive discussion leading to recom-
mendations aimed at protecting the accused from prejudicial news
stories. Recent surveys, which show that over one hundred ap-
peals in a two-year span have been based upon such prejudice,
not only indicate the enormity of the problem, but also destroy
* Mr. Schad is a member of the Editorial Staff of Prospectus.
U.S. CONST. Amend. VI.
2 San Jose Mercury-News, Sept. 25, 1965, at 1, 2 (cols and photo) as cited in A.B.A.
PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
To FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, at 29 (1968). Reference to the Tentative Draft of
December, 1966 will hereafter be cited as TENTATIVE DRAFT and reference to the
final approved draft of March, 1968 will hereafter be cited as APPROVED DRAFT.
3 Consider, for example, the indiscretions committed during the trial of Dr. Samuel
Sheppard, State v. Sheppard, 165 Ohio St. 293, 135 N.E.2d 340, 342 (1956), during
which the following headlines appeared in Cleveland newspapers, "SAM CALLED
A 'JEKYLL-HYDE' BY MARILYN, COUSIN TO TESTIFY" and "WHY
ISN'T SAM SHEPPARD IN JAIL" and "QUIT STALLING-BRING HIM
IN." As cited in TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 2, at 27-45.
Prejudicial publicity may also deny the prosecution a right to a "fair trial" by
slanting public opinion in favor of the defendant or by attacking the motives of the
prosecution in bringing the defendant to trial.
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the myth that the problem is limited to national causes celebres. 4
Two general approaches have been taken in an attempt to
ensure impartiality. The first approach suggests that existing
safeguards, when coupled with increasing public concern, will be
an adequate remedy for the problem. The other approach consists
of two principal viewpoints, each acknowledging that existing
measures have proven inadequate and that additional measures
are needed. The first view is that the problem would be resolved
by creating media codes which would prevent public dis-
semination of any prejudicial information received by the news
media. According to the second viewpoint, the problem could be
best resolved by preventing the initial release of prejudicial infor-
mation to the news media and by improving courtroom proce-
dures to minimize the impact of any such information inadvert-
ently released. This latter view is reflected in the standards for-
mulated by the American Bar Association (ABA) Committee on
Fair Trial and Free Press, headed by Justice Paul C. Reardon of
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 5 The Committee's
Standards, approved by the ABA's House of Delegates,6 are set
forth in the Appendix.
4 Hearings on S. 290 before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights and the Subcomm. on
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 306-09 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Hearings] as cited in
TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra, note 7, at 23.
"The threat was not confined merely to a handful of
isolated, truly sensational cases-though these do, of
course, place the greatest strain on our system of justice.
It extended as well to many lesser known cases that
attract notoriety in the community or throughout the
state." David L. Shapiro, the reporter for the Reardon
Committee, Transcript of the House of Delegates De-
bate at 153 (1968) (hereinafter cited as Transcript).
5 The Committee has issued two sets of standards accompanied by commentary. See note
2 supra.
This Committee is a subcommittee of the Central Committee on Minimum Stan-
dards of the Administration of Justice headed by J. Edward Lumbard, Chief Judge of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. II AM. B. NEWS (Jan. 15,
1966).
Two other studies have developed standards similar to the Reardon Standards. The
first study was undertaken by the New York Bar Association. Its conclusions were
published in SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON RADIO, TELEVISION, AND THE ADMINIS-
TRATION OF JUSTICE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS & FAIR TRIAL: FINAL REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS
[Vol. 3:1
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The author believes that the Reardon Standards, if imple-
mented, would provide an effective solution to the problem of
prejudicial information, and that this potential can be best realized
through adoption and enforcement of the Standards by the courts.
This conclusion is based upon analysis of the following issues:
(1) The nature of the problem, including an examination of (a)
the nature of prejudicial information, (b) those who create the
problem either by initially releasing or subsequently disseminating
such information, and (c) the related effect of courtroom proce-
dure upon the impact of such information. An analysis of these
issues suggests that a procedure must be developed which can
control those persons who either leak or disseminate prejudicial
information and which will diminish the deleterious impact of
such information.
(2) The effectiveness of present regulations. The author con-
(1967). Hereinafter cited as MEDINA REPORT after the committee's chairman, Judge
Harold R. Medina of the U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
The second study was undertaken by the Judicial Conference of the United States
through the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System, chaired by Judge Irving
Kaufman of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The conclusions of this
committee and its recommendations are contained in REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
THE OPERATION OF THE JURY SYSTEM ON THE "FAIR TRIAL- FREE PRESS" ISSUE
(1968, Sept.) [Hereinafter cited as the KAUFMAN REPORT]. This report has been
subsequently approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States. Each U.S.
District Court may, in the Court's discretion, adopt all or part of the report. For
example, the U.S. District Court for Northern Illinois adopted the report's recom-
mendations on Oct. 1, 1969.
The Kaufman Report closely resembles the Reardon Standards. With respect to
the provisions governing the conduct of lawyers and of courtroom personnel, the
Kaufman Report incorporated the Reardon Standards in toto. The Kaufman Com-
mittee stated:
The Committee is recommending adoption in substance
of the proposed Canon as it appears ... in the Reardon
Report. In the interest of establishing a uniform standard
of conduct for attorneys in criminal cases in both the
state and federal courts throughout the country, the
Committee feels that there is merit in adopting the sub-
stance of the formulation proposed to be included in the
American Bar Association's Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility.
With respect to procedural recommendations, the Kaufman report differs from the
Reardon Standards. The Kaufman Report noted that there are differences in "proce-
dures and experiences in state courts as compared to federal courts." The reports
also differed as to recommended restrictions upon police officers.
654 A.B.A.J. 343 (1968).
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cludes that existing safeguards do not, in fact, protect the ac-
cused's right to an impartial jury trial.
(3) The effectiveness of press media codes. The author con-
cludes that while these codes offer a new approach, they are
inherently incapable of providing a feasible solution to the prob-
lem.
(4) The effectiveness of the Reardon Standards. In examining
this issue, the collateral issues of the interpretation of the Stan-
dards and their relation to freedom of the press will be analyzed.
The author concludes that the Standards, if diligently enforced,
offer a solution to the problem that will be both effective and will
not violate the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press.
(5) The agency which could best adopt and enforce the Rear-
don Standards. It is the author's conclusion that the courts, rather
than police departments, bar associations or legislatures would be
best suited to implement these Standards. The author suggests
that the Standards be adopted through rule of court by the appel-
late courts in the various jurisdictions.
II. The Nature of the Problem
A. Prejudicial Information
An awareness of the nature of the problem of leakage and
dissemination of prejudicial information is a prerequisite to a
thorough understanding of the potential of the proposed solutions.
There are two interrelated categories of prejudicial publicity.
The first category consists of that publicity tainted with "editorial
prejudice." 7 The press can influence a trial with such publicity
even if there has been no release of official information. The press
7 The continuous headlines during the Sheppard trial serve as a glaring example of this
type of disruptive influence upon the trial process. See note 3 supra. The statements
of the Cleveland press during that trial, of course, are but one example of the abuses
of the freedom of the press by various newspapers.
It was not only the quantity and prominence of the(Cleveland newspapers') coverage but also the intrusion
of the newspapers into the merits of the case and the
effect of the (Cleveland) Press's editorial position on the
administration of justice that have made the episode the
[Vol. 3:1
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often creates its own editorial image of the defendant, especially
in cases of bizarre or brutal crimes.8
Another category of prejudicial information consists of infor-
mation, inadmissable as evidence during the trial, which is
"leaked" to the press by persons involved in the trial. Such a
leakage of information may occur at any time during the trial
process. This type of information shall be referred to as "nonjudi-
cial prejudice."
B. Sources of Prejudicial Information
While editorial prejudice has its source in the press, the source
of nonjudicial prejudice differs according to the time it is released.
During the period between arrest and commencement of the trial,
"the overwhelming preponderance of information. . . emanates
from police sources." Information released by police officers
usually consists of reports concerning the accused's refusal to
take lie detector tests, alleged confessions and prior convictions,'0
or consists of incriminating information obtained from the ac-
subject of such continuing concern and comment. A.
FRIENDLY & R. GOLDFARB, CRIME AND PUBLICITY:
THE IMPACT OF NEWS ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, 15 (1967).
For specific examples, see TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra
note 2, at 44-45.
8 See TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 2, at 29-45. Note, for example, the following press
release quoted in the dissenting opinion in State v. Williams.
Did you ever see a wild beast at bay-teeth exposed,
eyes glaring with fury, claws unsheathed for the savage
spring? Williams-William Williams-was the wild beast
this morning as he sat on the witness stand, baited,
surround, at bay.... The blood of the murdered lad and
his mother called calmly and coldly for vengeance, never
ceasing the appeal even when the exulting devil within
the man prompted him to cry out. 0, if he only held a
knife grasped tightly in his right hand ... Surely he
would have sprung from that witness stand screaming his
defiance, pale, distorted, to kill once more, with the grin
of contempt for the dangling hangman's noose. (19 Minn.
351, 373-74, 105 N.W. 265, 273-74 (1905) dissenting
opinion of Lewis, J.)
9 TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 2, at 28.
10 Id. at 28-30.
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cused himself before he had an opportunity to consult a lawyer.11
Occasionally, prosecutors make public statements concerning in-
formation relating to the merits of the case. 12
During the actual trial, however, the attorneys are generally the
main source of leakage. Attorneys often seek to place their case
before the press in order to create a "sympathetic audience"' 3
within the public. During this period, "leaks" can also emanate
from courtroom personnel.
In any case, the central danger posed by these statements is the
likelihood that the released information will not be forgotten by
the jurors.1 4 The adequate control of prejudicial information de-
mands the regulation of attorneys, courtroom personnel, police
officers and the press.
C. Utilization of Procedure
Effective use of procedural rules 15 is essential to decreasing the
impact of prejudicial information upon a trial; the failure to utilize
all available procedural safeguards probably guarantees that prej-
udicial publicity, once released, will influence the trial process.
For example, the Court's failure to question the jurors and to
grant a motion for continuance was noted by the United States
Supreme Court in its dramatic description of the events that
occurred during the first trial of Dr. Samuel Sheppard:
In a broadcast ... in Cleveland, Robert Con-
sidine likened Sheppard to a perjurer and
compared the episode to Alger Hiss' con-
frontation with Whittaker Chambers. Though
defense counsel asked the judge to question
the jury to ascertain how many heard the
broadcast, the court refused to do so. The
judge also overruled the motion for continu-
11 Id. at 30.
12 Id. at 33.
13 Id. at 37.
14 Id. at 40.
15 Important procedural tools generally available, include: exclusion of the public from all
or part of certain pre-trial conferences held in the absence of the jury; motions for
continuance; change of venue and waiver of jury trial; examination of prospective
jurors on voir dire to ascertain the existence of possible prejudice; cautioning the jury
and media representatives about the reporting of certain matters; sequestration of the
jury; and ultimately, setting aside a conviction for the failure of the trial court to take
such steps as conditions demand.
[Vol. 3:1I
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ance based on the same ground, saying:
"Well, I don't know, we can't stop people, in
any event, listening to it ... We are not going
to harass the jury every morning .... It is
getting to the point where if we do it every
morning, we are suspecting the jury. I have
confidence in this jury."'1
That "confidence" would no doubt have been shaken by a proper
appreciation of what Judge Bell of the Ohio Supreme Court called
"an atmosphere of a Roman Holiday for the News Media."' 17
Other examples of the impact upon the trial process of a failure
to employ available procedural tools do not seem necessary to
underscore the necessity of viable standards to guide the court in
using these tools to ameliorate the effects of both editorial and
nonjudicial prejudice.'
D. Inadequacy of Current Regulatory Devices
The present application of procedural rules and the existing
penalties for the leaking of prejudicial information do not deter
the injection of prejudicial information into the trial nor do they
significantly reduce its impact.
Some jurisdictions currently have no effective standards to
govern the application of available procedural tools.19 In those
jurisdictions that do, the standards have not been heeded, often
because of reluctance of trial courts to grant relief or the reluc-
tance of appellate courts to alter a trial judge's decision consid-
ered to be within his discretion.20
Continued reliance on present standards seems futile. More-
over, even if these procedural tools were utilized, they would not
eliminate the dissemination of prejudicial information because
6 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 at 347 (1966).
17 State v. Sheppard, supra note 3 at 294.
18 This failure of trial courts to utilize procedure is indicated by the 421 appeals based on
prejudice in state and federal appellate courts over the last two decades. A.B.A.
LEGAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON FAIR TRIAL & FREE PRESS, RIGHTS OF FAIR
TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (1969) 7 (hereinafter cited as ADVISORY MANUAL). See also
text accompanying note 4 supra.
19 TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 2 at 113. The term "standards" used in the text, refers to
those tests, established either through precedent or through rule of court which guide
a judge in his application of various procedural rules.
20 Id. at 74.
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they are designed to ameliorate the effects of such information
and not to control the sources of such information. Successful
solution to the problem is contingent upon the effect of deterrent
regulation aimed directly at the person who leaks or disseminates
information.2 1 Thus, while standards to provide guidance in the
use of available procedural tools are necessary, they must be
accompanied by regulations of a deterrent rather than a corrective
nature. Unfortunately, deterrent regulation sufficient to meet the
problem does not currently exist. 22 For example, the out-of-court
statements of attorneys have been heretofore regulated by Canon
2023 of the ABA Canons of Ethics. This provision, however,
proved to be wholly inadequate as a deterrent to irresponsible
statements by attorneys. 24 It has been recently replaced by sec-
21 Sole reliance on procedural tools, even if quite effective in reducing the damage wrought
by prejudicial information, would result in costly retrials and delay. Without reducing
either the leakage or dissemination of such information, the value of certain procedur-
al tools would be greatly reduced.
Moreover, the wider distribution of information, which
now quite commonly occurs on a statewide or nation-
wide basis, may often serve to render useless one of the
principal remedies-change of venue-designed to pro-
tect an accused who has been the subject of potentially
prejudicial new coverage. TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note
2 at 21-22.
22 The current regulations which are deterrent in focus include bar canons, internal regu-
lations of police departments, and court restrictions on court personnel.
23 ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 20, Newspaper Discussion of Pending
Litigation, [hereinafter cited as CANON 20].
Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or
anticipated litigation may interfere with a fair trial in the
Courts and otherwise prejudice the due administration ofjustice. Generally they are to be condemned. If the ex-
treme circumstances of a particular case justify a state-
ment to the public, it is unprofessional to make it anony-
mously. An ex parte reference to the facts should not go
beyond quotation from the records and papers on file in
the court; but even in extreme cases it is better to avoid
an ex parte statement.
24 What makes the ABA Canon 20 of dubious value in curbing this abuse
is that it is only applicable to newspaper discussion of
pending litigation "generally," and publicity is allowed
"in extreme circumstances." Thus these are exceptions,
but what the exceptions mean would seem to be left to
the imagination or judgment of the lawyer who resorts to
the public forum. Moreover, violations of the spirit of
Canon 20 have continued unpunished for so many years
as to make court proceedings of questionable effect un-
less Canon 20 is drastically amended. (MEDINA REPORT,
supra note 5 at 18.)
In the APPROVED DRAFT, supra note 2 at 36, the Committee stated that it had
uncovered only one case during Canon 20's sixty-two year existence where a viola-
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tion 1.1 of the Reardon Standards. 2 5 Section 1. 1, which set stan-
dards for the release by attorneys of information prior to or
during criminal litigation, is part of the ABA's new Code of
Professional Responsibility adopted August 11, 1969.26 This sec-
tion, in contrast to Canon 20, contains explicit standards as to
that information which can and cannot be released by attorneys in
a criminal litigation and contains penalties for violation of those
standards. 2 7 Accordingly, section 1. 1 holds forth greater promise
of deterring attorneys from releasing potentially prejudicial infor-
mation.
However, section 1. 1 will not affect the release of prejudicial
information by those not within the scope of the bar's control; not
all "intentional disseminators"2 8 are bound by the ABA canons.2 9
A belief that an increase of public concern will deter the re-
lease of prejudicial information runs contrary to actual ex-
tion of Canon 20 was in issue-and that decision seemed to be based on another
canon violation. State ex rel. Neb. Bar Ass'n v. Nielsen, 179 Neb. 55, 136 N.W.2d
355 (1965), cert. denied 383 U.S. 105 (1966).
The New Jersey Supreme Court adopted Canon 20 by rule of court in 1964 in the
case of State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841 (1964). Following the
publication of the Tentative Draft and the Sheppard decision, other courts have
suddenly become cognizant of Canon 20's existence. E.g., State v. Thompson, 273
Minn. 1, 139 N.W.2d 490 (1966). However, until 1968 not one "lawyer [had] been
disbarred, suspended from practice, or publicly censured for violation of Canon 20."
MEDINA REPORT supra note 5 at 17. In 1968, F. Lee Bailey achieved the distinction
of being the first attorney disciplined under Canon 20. He was removed as attorney
after sending an open letter to New Jersey Governor Hughes denouncing certain
aspects of a trial in which he was involved. State v. Kavanaugh, 52 N.J. 7, 243 A.2d
225 (1968).
25 See Section 1.1, App.
26 The Code of Professional Responsibility is the revised version of the former A BA Code
of Ethics. Of course, ABA adoption of Section 1.1, even coupled with increased
pressure for voluntary compliance, may not in and of itself eliminate prejudicial
activities by all lawyers. Adoption by state and local bar associations, which promul-
gate their own canons, is necessary as well. The majority of hearings on canon
violations seem to occur at the state and local bar level. Thus, it appears as though
most violations are treated as violations of state or local bar canons and are dealt with
on that level.
.7 Judge Reardon remarked that:
There has been complaint about (Canon 20) from many
sources on grounds that (1) it has never been freighted
with definite meaning, and (2) it has never been en-
forced .... In our judgment, the canon was not
sufficiently explicit and lacked muscle. (Emphasis added)
THE FAIR TRIAL-FREE PRESS STANDARDS 54 A.B.A.J. 343, 344 (April, 1968).
28 An "intentional disseminator" for the purpose of this paper is one who violates the
prohibitions contained within section 4 of the Standards. See App. Part IV.
29 For example, individual police officers are unlikely to abide voluntarily by the mandate
of the ABA.
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perience. General principles of decency and respect for the judi-
cial process have failed to motivate self-restraint in the past, and
there is little reason to believe they will do so in the future.
It seems fair to conclude that present regulations are neither of
sufficient deterrent nor curative effect to alleviate the problem of
prejudicial information. Other efforts have similarly fallen short of
the goal.
E. Inadequacy of Proposed Regulatory Devices:
Media Codes
Existing media codes are the product of state or local news
media organizations or of professional associations within the
state (Media Codes). Occasionally, a state or local bar group and
a media group will co-author the code after joint discussion
(Bar-Media Codes). 30 Not until recently, however, has it been
seriously contended that media codes in and of themselves could
solve the problem. Indeed, the press at one time contended that
the codes would do more harm than good.31 Whether or not
30 These groups could include such organizations as N.B.C. and C.B.S. and such associ-
ations as Newspaper Publishers Associates and State Association of Broadcasters.
Bar-Media Codes have been established in Oklahoma, Oregon, Massachusetts,
Washington and Colorado. ADVISORY MANUAL, supra note 18 at 22.
Voluntary agreements on press guidelines have been established in Arizona, Colo-
rado, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washing-
ton, and Wisconsin as well as the cities of Toledo and Cleveland. Id., New York
State Fair Trial - Free Press Conference has recently created voluntary guidelines for
criminal reporting. A number of both media and media-bar codes are quite com-
prehensive. For example, "The Compact of Understanding" adopted by the Okla-
homa Bar-Media Relations Committee in 1968 includes a preamble, a statement of
principles, and a detailed index expurgatorius delineating information that "may
jeopardize the rights of the defendant." Id. at 25, codes such as that of the State of
Washington, contain shorter statements in which all signators take notice of the great
danger that prejudicial information poses to a juror's impartiality. See for example,
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES OF THE BENCH-BAR-PRESS OF THE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, cited in APPROVED DRAFT, supra note 18, App. D. at
22.
31 The media's belief in the efficacy of press codes is a recent development. In 1965, the
Press-Bar Committee of the American Society of Newspaper Editors issued a report
stating:
We are persuaded that no set of specific rules can be
written into a code of press conduct that will not do more
harm than good. We are convinced that the solution to
whatever problems of FREE (sic) Press-Fair-Trial that
may exist will not be solved by such codes.
As quoted by Judge Reardon during the ABA Debate, Feb. 1968: Transcript supra
note 4 at 147.
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harmful, however, media codes will not solve the problem.32
Media codes are inherently inadequate devices to curb dis-
semination of prejudicial information. First, where state-wide or
city-wide voluntary codes have been established, there is no guar-
antee that all major communications media organizations will
join; some publications will remain free to print whatever they
like.33
Second, even should all media organizations in a given area
bind themselves to a code, cessation of prejudicial dissemination
is not assured. These voluntary codes often consist of little more
than general substantive principles of free speech and fair trial
interlaced with vague regulatory guidelines.a 4 Even where a de-
tailed index expurgatorius is included, there is frequently a clause
stating, for example, that:
An editor, who must ultimately make the de-
cision whether to publish or broadcast,
should weigh these varying responsibilities. 3 5
32 The ABA Legal Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press, headed by Chief
Justice Edward Devitt of the U.S. District Court of Minnesota (the Devitt Com-
mittee), was charged with the task of assisting "effectuating the (Reardon) recommen-
dations ... " and "encouraging cooperation of the bar and media in voluntary measure
to protect the rights of Fair Trial and Free Press." 16 COORDINATOR & PUBL.
RELATION BULL. I (April, 1968). The Devitt Committee felt that the press codes
may be viewed as possible alternatives to the standards:
Ultimately, the decision will rest with the courts in each
jurisdiction to decide, in light of experience with the
codes, whether or not it is necessary to apply the stan-
dards by rules of court. [Emphasis added]
ADVISORY MANUAL, supra note 18 at 30.
33 One of the best-known examples of a voluntary code is the Massachusetts Guide for the
Bar and News Media.... It was approved ... by the Massachusetts and Boston Bar
Associations, and was adopted in 1963 by the Massachusetts Broadcasters' Associ-
ation and by twenty-six daily newspapers and thirty-six weeklies in the state, (the
major big-city dailies, with one exception, refused to join). FRIENDLY & GOLDFARB,
supra note 7 at 123. Judge Reardon stated during the debate in the ABA's House of
Delegates at Transcript, supra note 4 at 148, "We have evidences in writing of the
policy of refusal of certain newspapers ever to bind themselves to a code."
34 A reading of the [Massachusetts] Guide [for the Bar and News Media] leads to the
assumption ... that its drafters wrestled with the problem but could not pin its
shoulders to the mat. The categories of tabooed publications and utterances are so
loosely worded as to serve only as broad indicators rather than as operable definitions
of what may be inimical to fair trial. But the instruction that these categories should
be "avoided" rather than prohibited evidences a conclusion that a tight and en-
forceable rule is impossible. FRIENDLY & GOLDFARB, supra note 7 at 124.
35 "Compact of Understanding" adopted by Oklahoma Bar-Media Committee (1968) as
cited in ADVISORY MANUAL, supra note 18 App. D at 22-26.
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Leaving the power to decide whether certain information is or is
not prejudicial with the person to be regulated is hardly an ade-
quate means of control. It accomplishes little if any editor decides
to publish potentially prejudicial information. And there is clearly
no guarantee that all editors will agree in their decisions. 36 There-
fore information which is in fact prejudicial may still be released.
Third, since such codes are voluntary, they may be ignored
entirely. Voluntary adherence to the code may well be replaced
by a desire to sell more newspapers. There is, after all, no sanc-
tion for breach of a media code; and sensationalism in criminal
reporting sells newspapers.
Day in and day out, as readership surveys
make brutally clear and as common knowl-
edge confirms, the best read items in a news-
paper are those about crime .... [Ilt is a fact.
Every editor knows it. With or ... without
readership surveys, he knows that crime
news is the hottest article on his counter.
Within limits-within rather far extended lim-
its, to be honest about it-the publication of
criminal news bolsters readership and circula-
tion. It is safe to say that no general- circula-
tion newspaper can survive without
rather abundant news about crime, even
though this cannot be proved. ..37
If one newspaper releases information about criminal events, it
is realistic to assume that others will print similar stories, espe-
cially when such information is readily available.
The press cannot be expected to refrain from
printing statements issued by public officials,
as for example the United States Attorney,
even though such statements may be pre-
36 Both the Toledo Blade and Times adopted a "code of guidelines" in 1966. However, it
has been noted that:
The conclusion is hard to resist that what the Toledo
papers are saying is that in the routine cases where
prejudicial publicity is a rare or minor factor they will
avoid publication of categories of crime and trial news
generally believed to produce the most prejudicial re-
sults, but that they reserve the right to print all the news
in sensational cases...
FRIENDLY & GOLDFARB supra note 7 at 124-125.
37 Id. at 35-36.
[Vol. 3:1i
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judicial to a fair trial. The only way to stop
this abuse is to stop it at the source.38
In summary, media codes will not eliminate the problem since
there is no assurance that all will join, agree on interpretation of
code restrictions or ultimately obey the codes they have signed.
III. The Reardon Standards: An Effective Approach
A. Introductory Remarks
The Reardon Standards focus upon the prevention of release of
certain information by individual police officers,3 9 court person-
nel, 40 lawyers, 4 1 and "intentional disseminators." 42 The Standards
also set up uniform guidelines to govern the application of court-
room procedure. 43 The Standards are not self-executing. They are
merely a report, and they therefore lack the authority to demand
compliance. The Standards are without effect unless adopted and
enforced by the control agencies, that is, police departments, bar
associations, courts and legislatures. If so implemented, the Rear-
don Standards, interpreted as minimum standards, will offer a
viable solution to the problem of prejudice.
B. Reardon Standards: Effective Minimum Standards
The Reardon Standards attempt to prevent the initial release of
information by penalizing violators; that is, the Standards at-
tempt to control the sources of prejudicial information. They also
contain realistic provisions to guide the court in applying the
general procedural rules designed to minimize the effect of prej-
udicial information on the trial.
Part III of the Standards contains provisions governing the use
of motions to exclude the public from pre-trial hearings, 44 for
38 New York Times, Sept. 5, 1956, p. 26.
39 See Section 2. 1, App.
40 See Section 2.3, App.
41 See Section 1. 1, App.
42 See Part IV, App. and note 28, supra.
43See Part 111, App.
44 See Section 3. 1, App.
December 19691
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change of venue, continuance, 45 or waiver of jury,46 and for
setting aside a verdict. 47 Part III also contains the standards for
selection of jurors48 and for conducting the trial including seque-
stration of the jurors.49 These provisions were designed to make
such motions effective in protecting the trial from prejudicial
publicity that may have already saturated the local community.
The Reardon Committee recognized that the potential of avail-
able procedural tools would be realized only if trial judges follow-
ed the standards set out in the Report.50 The Committee empha-
sized recent court decisions holding that "failure to utilize these
techniques may constitute a denial of due process invalidating a
conviction." 51 The Committee felt that appellate courts have a
duty to ensure that the Standards, once adopted in a jurisdiction,
are properly employed by the trial judge. 52
Closer appellate review would place a duty on trial judges to
follow the Standards. For example, whenever there is a "substan-
tial likelihood" that a jury has been influenced by "exposure to
extra-judicial communication," the trial judge would be compelled
to set aside the verdict under section 3.6. The Committee sug-
gests that failure of the trial judge to apply the standard would be
an abuse of discretion subject to reversal on appeal. 53 The Rear-
don Standards, if implemented, would, in effect, impose a duty on
the trial judge to use available procedural techniques in accor-
dance with these Standards, thereby ensuring that the impact of
prejudicial information would be minimal.
The Standards provide that those who violate the provisions
regulating the release of information will be punished. One who
4 See Section 3.2, App.
46 See Section 3.3, App.
47 See Section 3.6, App.
48 See Section 3.4, App.49 See Section 3.5, App.
50 As the committee noted in TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 2, at 74:
Study of the reported decisions, together with field re-
search, indicates that the potential effectiveness of these
devices is substantially greater than their present value.
This gap is due principally to the present reluctance of
the trial courts to grant relief and to the unwillingness of
appellate courts to interfere with the trial judges dis-
cretion. [Emphasis added].
51 TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 2 at 112. For a detailed discussion of case law see note
108, infra.
52 Id. at 74.
5 3 1d. at 74.
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releases information intended to influence a trial (intentional dis-
seminator) would risk a contempt of court citation. 54 Police
officers, courtroom employees, and lawyers would face suspen-
sion or disciplinary action by the police department, court, or the
bar, respectively. 55 The threat of discipline by the organized bar,
and the police department supplemented by judicial or legislative
enforcement of the Standards should deter such disclosures.
Only in the case of editorial prejudice did the Committee fail to
recommend sanctions, although existing procedural tools, if prop-
erly utilized, might serve to reduce the damaging impact of such
publicity. The Committee refused to make such recommendations
because (1) direct restraints on the press would probably be
unconstitutional, 56 (2) the Committee concluded that editorial
prejudice was a minor aspect of the total problem, 57 and (3) the
Committee felt that the media were becoming increasingly aware
of the danger of prejudicial information.
... [T]here has been in recent years... an
impressive increase in the exercise of respon-
sible restraint on the part of many news
media organizations .... Certainly these en-
couraging signs militate against present adop-
tion of sweeping restrictions against the
media themselves. 58
As a result, the Reardon Committee viewed media codes as a
sufficient means of restricting editorial prejudice, and did not feel
compelled to suggest regulations to govern this aspect of the
problem. This, in effect, leaves a loophole in the otherwise per-
vasive regulations proposed in the Standards. The existence of
this loophole, probably motivated by constitutional consid-
erations, necessitates a reliance on a continuing evolution of the
media's efforts to regulate itself.
The Reardon Standards should, for the large part, deter dis-
54 Part IV, App.
55 Parts 1, II, App.
56 See TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 2, at 7 1.
57 It bears underscoring that of all the instances discussed.., which sug-
gest the possibility of serious prejudice, the over-
whelming majority involve information released by
official sources or obtained in the course of public pro-
ceedings. Exceedingly few stem from independent in-
vestigations by the news media or from the taking of a
strong editorial position in a particular criminal case
while it is pending. Id. at 39.
58 Id. at 71-72.
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semination of prejudicial information and minimize the impact of
any such dissemination which does occur.
C. The Reardon Standards, Mass
Media, and the First Amendment
1. The Free Press Issue
The freedom of the press issue has been debated with consid-
erable emotion since the Standards were released.59 During de-
bate over adoption in the ABA's House of Delegates, members of
the press argued that the Standards went too far.60 The press felt
that the Standards would not allow the media to warn the commu-
nity of imminent danger.
[A]nd further.... your committee's recom-
mendations would in effect deny the law abid-
ing citizens of this country information that
may be vitally important to them in their des-
perate struggle to protect themselves from
the criminal element of society which today is
a pervading evil force in our communities.6 1
59 An example of the emotional responses to the Reardon Report is seen in the following
excerpt from a Chicago Tribune editorial which was reprinted in 54 A.B.A.J. 368
(1968):
What gives the "A.B.A." its belief that it is somehow
empowered to legislate regulations on another profes-
sion, which certainly, in view of the behavior of some
lawyers and some jurists, has a reputation for fairness
and honesty at least equal to its own[?]
60 But the idea that an absolutely antiseptic atmosphere can be created
around said jurors by restricting the publication of crime
news does not appeal to us as the practical solution to
the problem. Our principal points of disagreement with
your (Reardon) committee are as to the magnitude of the
fair trial problem and as to the over-kill effect of the
measures which your committee proposes as the means
for solving the problem. Mr. Tenant Bryan, representa-
tive of the American Newspaper Publishers' Associ-
ation. Transcript, supra note 4 at 176.
6i Transcript, supra note 4 at 177. See § 1. 1, § 2.1, App. For example certain members of
the press have argued that the media should be allowed to release more information
about the accused.
(The public) need(s) to know the nature, the extent, the
causes of crime and the way their police, their prose-
cutors, and their courts are handling it. They need to
know about the character of persons arrested. Are they
chiefly teenagers in trouble for the first time, or are they
hardened repeaters? (the public) are frightened and con-
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The standards do not prevent the immediate release of informa-
tion necessary to warn the public of "danger." As the Reporter to
the Reardon Committee stated during the debates:
At the same time, the Committee has recog-
nized the need for immediate disclosure of
such matters as the fact and circumstances of
arrest, a description of the offense charged, a
description of the physical evidence seized,
and any information needed to aid in appre-
hension or to warn the public of danger.
Though there are potential hazards to fair
trial in the release of this information, they
are outweighed by such factors as the need to
guard against secret arrest and secret law en-
forcement and the need to protect the public
by securing the apprehension of suspected
criminals.6 2
Indeed, by clearly delineating the kind of information which both
the police and lawyers can release without fear of penalty, the
Standards encourage the release of that information necessary to
inform the public of any immediate danger.
The press also expressed a fear that the Standards would
weaken the ability of the press to expose governmental corruption
and graft that occasionally runs "rampant in many jurisdictions of
the nation."'6 3 This fear is unfounded:
fused. If fears... and even panic are to be allayed,
police must be able to disclose more than just the names,
ages, residences and occupation of persons under arrest.
... (Mr. Theodore Koop, Vice President, Columbia
Broadcasting System) Transcript, supra note 4, at
196-197.
62 Id. at 156: The Reardon Committee stated:
A vital factor in the Committee's consideration has been
its desire not to recommend any steps that would impair
the benefits derived from criminal news coverage or abr-
idge the constitutional freedoms of speech and of the
press. TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 2 at 68.
The Committee noted several beneficial aspects of reporting criminal news during
different stages of the trial. The Committee stated:
... Perhaps most important, reports of the arrest and of
the nature of the charge.., can serve to assure the com-
munity that law enforcement officers have been doing
their job and that there is probable cause to believe that
the man apprehended did commit the offense. Id. at 48.
63 Transcript, supra note 4, at 18 1.
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The restrictions, it must be remembered,
would apply only to those who by virtue of
their profession or position in government
have a fiduciary obligation to support the sys-
tem they help to administer. The media
would not be precluded from exposing what
they regarded as improper conduct by such
persons, and the Committee therefore does
not believe that the restrictions would make it
easier to "frame" a defendant or to "fix" a
case. Moreover, it is especially significant
that the restrictions would apply only to a
given period in the criminal process; the
question, then, is not whether certain dis-
closures may be made, but when. [Emphasis
original]6 4
The Committee recognized the value of editorial criticism of
the judicial process.
During the trial ... reporting can help to en-
sure that the conduct of those who participate
in the trial -judges, lawyers, and wit-
nesses-live up to the standards that our sys-
tem of justice demands.6 5
The Committee was therefore opposed to adoption of the Brit-
ish system which allows a judge to punish the press by contempt
for "improper criticism of the court or of himself." 66
Concern of the press that the Reardon Standards would "si-
lence" the media is unfounded. The Standards achieve an equi-
table balance between fair trial and free press. 67
64 Transcript, TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 2 at 78.
6 Id. at 50.
66 Id. at 68. See FRIENDLY & GOLDFARB, supra note 7, at 141-157.
The only evidence that would support the press accusation that they would be
restricted by the standards is the recommendations for use of contempt and standards
for excluding the public from certain pre-trial conferences. However, the Standards'
use of contempt is presently restricted so as not to apply to press releases unless the
press intentionally seeks to influence the outcome of a jury trial. When the press is
excluded from portions of pre-trial, the standards demand that complete records be
kept of the proceedings and that they be publicly released after the trial. The
recommendations of the committee therefore do not significantly interfere with the
press's ability to expose corruption.
67 The attempts being made by Judge Devitt's Committee to encourage discussion between
the bar and the press can only help to clarify the nature of the Reardon Standards.
Judge Devitt has publicly commented that he favors more cooperative effort between
the two professions on the local level in seeking to achieve a better appreciation of
our mutual problems and joint action. The Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and
Free Press stated in the preface to its recently released information manual:
[Vol. 3:1
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2. The Free Speech Issue
The Reardon Standards would not violate freedom of speech. 68
The United States Supreme Court in Bridges v. California69
described the test for determining whether a court could con-
stitutionally restrict the dissemination of a statement because of
its prejudicial effect. That test is whether the statement created a
"clear and present danger" to the enforcement of justice. 70 To
establish the constitutionality of the Reardon Standards, it must
be determined whether the Standards prohibit statements other
than those which, if permitted, would create a "clear and present
danger" to the defendant's rights to a fair trial by an impartial
jury.
Any member of the bar or of an enforcement agency may be
subject to sanctions for violation of Parts I and II of the Reardon
Standards, which apply specifically to these groups. 71 The Rear-
don Standards also contain a specific contempt provision. Section
4.1 of the Reardon Standards permits contempt sanctions in two
situations, both carefully designed to ensure the Standards' con-
stitutionality under the "clear and present danger" test.72
There need be no basic incompatibility in the application
of the First and Sixth Amendments separately or in
tandem. It remains for all concerned to make a sincere
effort to prove that fact-an effort which will require
sustained cooperation and interchange. For that price, all
our rights and liberties can be made the more se-
cure.... (vii)
That this cooperation is increasing is verified by the increasing number of press codes
that have been recently created.
68 It is clear that the standard governing removal of the public from a pre-trial hearing does
not violate the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The action is taken only
where the prosecution has failed to prove there is no substantial likelihood of prej-
udicial interference or the dissemination of material not qualified under the rules of
evidence. Even when the proceedings are closed, a complete record must be kept and
must be later made public. With respect to this provision, the committee stated:
The committee believes that the proposed rule is plainly
desirable, that it strikes a fair balance between the inter-
ests of the parties and those of the general public, and
that it does not violate the constitutional guarantees of
public trial. TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 2, at 114.
69314 U.S. 252, (1941) In Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912 (1950), the
opinion of Justice Frankfurter discusses the constitutional limitations of the First
Amendment. For an interesting discussion of this issue, see Barist, The First A mend-
ment & Regulation of Prejudicial Publicity: An Analysis, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 425
(1968).
70 86 L.Ed. at 203.
71 See Parts I and 11, App.72 See Part IV, App.
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First, the contempt sanction may be used against a person who,
knowing that a criminal trial by jury is in progress, or that a jury
is being selected for such a trial, disseminates information that is
willfully designed to effect the outcome of the trial and that
"seriously threatens" to have that effect. 73 By requiring that a
statement seriously threaten the outcome of a trial, the Standards
ensure that the contempt sanction will not be used unless there is
a clear and present danger.74 The Standards require that the
dissemination be intended to affect the outcome of the trial. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Worcester Telegram
& Gazette, Inc. v. Commonwealth75 reversed the trial court's
application of contempt sanctions against a newspaper edi-
tor-publisher who had printed an article mentioning that the ac-
cused was presently serving a prison term. Noting that it was the
newspaper's policy not to print criminal records until they are
accepted as part of the court records, the court held that the
defendants did not willfully intend to affect the outcome of the
trial.76 To avoid interference with First Amendment rights, the
court suggested that contempt be limited to intentional violation:
... [A] working principle... must be ex-
tremely serious and the degree [of] immi-
nence extremely high before such utterances
can be punished. (Bridges v. California 314
U.S. 252)... Where a grand jury is involved,
in the absence of some.., showing of a sub-
stantive evil actually designed to impede the
course of justice in justification of the ex-
ercise of the contempt power to silence the
petitioner, his utterances are to be pro-
tected. [Emphasis added]77
The mens rea requirement of the contempt sanction in Section
4.1 diminishes the possible application of this sanction and ac-
cordingly, may limit its effectiveness.
73 ld.
74 Though the Standards use the words "seriously threatens" rather than "clear and
present danger," as pointed out during the House of Delegates Debate, the tests
seem identical. The committee indicated in the commentary that the statement must
be one that "seriously threatens to affect the outcome of the trial." Thus there must
be a clear and present danger that the evil would occur. Transcript, supra note 4, at
166.
75 238 N.E.2d 861 (1968).




Second, Section 4.1 of the Standards also provides that the
contempt power may be used when a person contravenes a valid
judicial order restricting the dissemination of information that is
revealed during a judicial hearing closed to the jury. 78 The action
taken by the judge to prevent the jury from hearing this poten-
tially prejudicial information suggests that its disclosure would
otherwise create a clear and present danger. In this situation, the
use of the contempt sanction appears to be within the con-
stitutional limitations of the clear and present danger test.,79
Persuasive arguments can be made that statements of enforce-
ment officers may create a clear and present danger. However,
dictum in County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court80 suggests
that restriction of such statements would be unconstitutional:
*..with respect to the police and the press in
the entire pretrial period we think it unwise
and detrimental to the public interest to give
such contempt powers to the courts and thejudges. Moreover, we think that such pro-
ceedings and the court rules, legislation or
what not else authorizing such contempt pro-
ceedings might well be held to be a violation
of the First Amendment guarantees of free
press and free speech.81
Nevertheless, a more comprehensive examination suggests that
there are sufficient dangers to justify the limited restraints that the
Reardon committee has recommended.
Any remarks that an enforcement officer makes early in the
post-arrest period set the pattern for future publicity and tend to
serve as a catalyst for subsequent prejudicial dissemination. The
resulting possibility of spiraling prejudicial dissemination could be
71 See Section 4. 1(b) App.
79 Even if there is no clear and present danger, this section is constitutional:
One who procures or suborns a contempt with knowl-
edge that so doing is in violation of a valid court order
has always been punishable as a contemptor. What is
punished in such a case is the subornation of the con-
tempt, not the publication of the data obtained, through
the subornation.
Transcript, supra note 4 at 167.
80 County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 253 Cal. App. 670, 62 Cal. Rptr. 435 (Ct. of
Appeal, 2d District 1967).
81 Id. at 690.
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a basis for finding a clear and present danger. Furthermore, once
the seeds of prejudice have been sown, they may linger in a
prospective juror's mind.82
Statements by the police immediately prior to and during a trial
are likely to be more extensively covered by the media. "Further
[the juror] may be more inclined to seek out this information
when he is personally involved in the case." 8 3 As a result, the
possibility that jurors will come into contact with such statements
and that such statements will have a serious influence on their
deliberations is increased. These prejudicial statements are there-
fore likely to create a "clear and present danger" that the verdict
will be tainted. Carefully defined court restrictions on police re-
marks between completion of formal investigation and the trial
itself seem therefore justified.
The constitutional questions with respect to attorneys and
court employees are somewhat less uncertain. The activities of
lawyers and courtroom personnel are more closely linked to the
judicial process and to individual jurors. Consequently, that infor-
mation which would create a clear and present danger if released
by police would be more dangerous if released by members of
these groups. The few cases decided under Canon 20 and the
Sheppard decision assume the the constitutionality of the courts'
power to restrict the release of such information by attorneys.
This assumption points to the constitutionality of the Reardon
Standards' provisions setting restrictions upon attorneys84 and the
rationale underlying this assumption is arguably applicable to
other courtroom personnel.
D. The Problems of Interpretation and Enforcement
The Reardon Standards offer a viable approach to ensuring the
defendant's rights to a fair trial. However, their potential would
82 "First, the processes by which beliefs are formed and adhered to, and their effect on
perception, appear to take place to a large extent below the level of consciousness."
TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 2 at 64.
83 Id. at 40.
84 See note 24 supra for listing of cases dealing with Canon 20 and Sheppard v. Maxwell,
supra note 16, at 333. The Reardon Committee's commentary in the TENTATIVE
DRAFT contain a thorough discussion of the constitutionality of those provisions
pertinent to lawyers and courtroom personnel. The discussion of the constitutionality
of a provision is included in the comment upon that provision TENTATIVE DRAFT,
supra note 2, at 84-94 and 110-111.
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be severely restricted if a "voluntary interpretation" approach
were adopted. 85 "Voluntary interpretation" means that individual
lawyers, police officers, and courtroom personnel could view the
standards as mere voluntary guidelines. Moreover, under this
interpretation, judges in those jurisdictions in which the Standards
are adopted may determine that it is within their discretion to
refuse to apply the Standards.8 6 Thus, voluntary interpretation of
the Standards after adoption would be no more effective than
voluntary adherence to their fundamental principles without ac-
tual adoption. If the Standards were adopted and applied as
guidelines only, some individuals might feel a greater moral obli-
gation to obey the Standards than if no action at all were taken.
However, the danger would still exist that an individual's reasons
for leaking prejudicial information in a given case may outweigh
any increased sense of moral obligation. Therefore voluntary in-
terpretation of the Standards would be inadequate to the task of
eliminating the leakage and dissemination of prejudicial informa-
tion.
Unless implemented in toto, the Standards will not solve the
problem. As indicated above, adoption by the ABA of section 1.1
of the Reardon Standards will not in and of itself bind all law-
yers.8 7 Furthermore, police officers and intentional disseminators,
as previously noted, are not likely to voluntarily obey a non-
enforceable code.
Without complete adherence to the Standards by all who are in
a position to leak information, the impact of prejudicial publicity
8 Unfortunately, the Devitt Committee still feels a voluntary interpretation of the Stan-
dards would be adequate:
The standards complement rather than supersede the
voluntary codes already adopted in some states and un-
der consideration in others. They are guidelines through
which the bar and media jointly can protect the fairness
of trials and prevent miscarriages of justice resulting
from prejudicial publicity, without impeding the right and
duty of the press to inform the public about crime and
law enforcement. [Emphasis added]
ADVISORY MANUAL, supra note 18 at 29.
86 It has been argued by some that the failure to enforce Canon 20 resulted from its
vagueness. See note 27, supra. Nevertheless, the ease in which the New Jersey
Supreme Court applied the canon in the Van Duyne case, supra note 22, suggests
that it was not the vagueness but rather the absence of any duty on the part of the
courts to enforce the canon which led to its disuse. A similar fate might face the
Reardon Standards unless they are adopted and enforced by the appellate courts.
87 See note 26 supra.
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will not be significantly decreased. Partial adherence to the Rear-
don Standards by lawyers, courtroom personnel, and police
officers would not be a significant improvement over the present
state of affairs. Partial elimination of the sources of prejudicial
statements merely changes the composition of the pool from
which the mass media can draw. Therefore all the Standards must
be binding and be vigorously enforced.
V. Alternative Avenues of Adoption and Enforcement
A. Introductory Remarks
Since the Reardon Standards are not self-executing, the most
effective means of implementation must be determined. In deter-
mining which enforcement agency (police departments, courts,
legislatures, or bar associations) is best suited to adopt and en-
force the Standards, two factors and must be analyzed. First, it
must be determined which agency has the power to enforce re-
strictions on those whose activities the Standards are intended to
curtail. Second, it must be determined which agency might ac-
tually be persuaded to adopt the Standards and enforce them.
An analysis of these questions with respect to bar associations,
legislatures and police departments leads to the conclusion that
these agencies could not adequately fill this role. Rather, imple-
mentation can be best effected by the courts.
B. Bar Associations
Section 1.1 of the Standards governing the release of informa-
tion by lawyers has been recently incorporated into the new ABA
Code of Professional Responsibility. This action alone, however,
does not guarantee adherence by all attorneys; adoption by state
and local bar associations is also necessary. Yet the Reardon
Committee was not satisfied with voluntary adoption of this sec-
tion by bar associations alone. It urged that section 1.1 be
adopted by rule of court or statute in the various jurisdictions.
The Committee felt that judicial recognition of section 1.1 would
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provide double protection against prejudicial dissemination by
attorneys. 88
In any case, it is clear that further action by the other enforce-
ment agencies is required if the remaining Standards are to be
fully implemented.8 9
C. Police Departments
Section 2.2 of the Standards suggests that police departments
should be granted "reasonable time" to achieve effective
self-regulation. However, many police departments have not ade-
quately regulated release of trial-related information by their
officers in the past.90 Moreover, the present extent of police
disclosure makes obvious the failure of many police departments
to enforce effective news restrictions against individual officers. 91
The long history of inadequate self-regulation suggests that the
police departments have already had a "reasonable time" to
achieve internal regulation.
Yet, despite this history of inaction, the Reardon Committee in
the Approved Draft argued that a greater degree of cooperation
by the police departments might be expected within a "reasonable
time," and that the courts would not therefore have to adopt by
rule of court the internal regulations governing release of informa-
tion by police departments set forth in section 2.1. The Justice
Department had already imposed the Katzenbach Rules govern-
ing the release of information by its own officers,92 and the Rear-
88 TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 2 at 95.
89 See text accompanying notes 26-29.
90 See note 9 supra.
91 Indeed, as the MEDINA REPORT states:
We have documented in our Interim Report at pages
117-43 the remarkably divergent policies followed by
police organizations throughout the country. Some de-
partments have little or no formal criteria governing the
dissemination of information to news media. Others,
while professing to maintain standards, have promul-
gated regulations too broad and too general to be of
concrete value. MEDINA REPORT, supra note 5 at 3 1.
92 Office of the Attorney General, Statement of Policy Concerning the Release of Informa-
tion by Personnel of the Department of Justice Relating to Criminal Proceedings. 28
C.F.R. 50.2, reprinted in TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 2 at 259 et seq. Apparently




don Committee hoped that this example would be followed on the
state and local level. However, since 1966, there appears to have
been no noticeable surge of self-regulation among local and state
enforcement agencies.
The Approved Draft, strangely enough, continues to sound the
trumpet of hope for self-regulation and the Committee claims that
there have been several noteworthy developments. The Com-
mittee points out that certain nonpolice groups have become
cognizant of the need for police restrictions,93 and that "a number
of law enforcement agencies have indicated a willingness to take
steps toward self-regulation .... ,,94 However, the only evidence
of this new willingness that the Committee presented was the
"Statement of Principles of the Bench-Bar-Press of the State of
Washington,"95 which was signed by the Washington Association
of Sheriffs and Chiefs of Police. Although such action may in-
dicate a willingness by that Police Association to sign a voluntary
code, it does not guarantee that the Association will actively bind
individual police officers to restrictions on the release of news
contained therein. The Reardon Report's use of the Medina Re-
port as evidence that self-regulation is occurring is not justified. 96
Indeed, the Medina Report in fact contains compelling reasons
why police departments are not likely to restrict press releases by
their personnel.
93 Since the issuance of the report in October 1966, there have been a
number of noteworthy developments. First, the need for
limited restrictions on the release of information by law
enforcement officers has received support from several
sources, including the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, the Special
Committee of the Bar Association of the City of New
York [Medina Report], and the American Civil Liberties
Union, APPROVED DRAFT, supra note 2 at 22.
However noteworthy these groups are, their support for restrictions on law enforce-
ment officers does not in any way prove that these officers are beginning to regulate
the release of information.
94 ld.
95 Id. at 29-30.
96 The Medina Report cites only one instance of possible self regulation. However, it is
unclear from the text of the Report whether the police department involved actually
did adopt and enforce the restrictions. MEDINA REPORT, supra note 5 at 35.
One reason for the Reardon Report's use of the Medina Report is that the Reardon
Committee may be uncertain whether courts do have the power to regulate dis-
closures by police officers during the pretrial period. The Medina Repo-t was of the
opinion that courts do not possess this power. See text at 127 infra. Perhaps the
Reardon Committee was willing to allow the police departments a "reasonable time"
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The Committee is well aware of the forces
which lead police agencies into patterns of
full disclosure to news media .... Pressures
begin to build up for concrete indications that
the case is nearing solution and that the per-
petrator [of crimes] will soon be in custo-
dy. . . The news media . . . press a relentless
search for full details, . . . [a]nd the police,
anxious to avoid a running battle with news-
papermen, unfair critical editorial comment,
and general ill-will, are tempted into pre-
mature and prejudicial releases. To avoid the
accusation of suppressing information which
might tend to cast the police in an unfavor-
able light, some departments have adopted an
"open door" policy to news media and permit
them wide access to reports and personnel. 97
These reasons not only explain prior failures by police depart-
ments to regulate themselves, but also suggest why many depart-
ments will be slow to adopt the Standards.
As the Reardon Committee notes, "[t]here is, of course, no
unanimity of view [regarding regulation], and some important law
enforcement officials are steadfastly opposed to any restrictions,
at least in the absence of corresponding limitations on the
media." 98 It is not unreasonable to assume that only external
pressure will cause these police departments to regulate their
news releases.99 This pressure must be supplied by the courts or
the legislatures through the adoption of section 2.1 by rule of
court or by statute. 100
hoping that the police would institute self regulatory programs and thereby avoid a
possible constitutional challenge of section 2.2 which grants courts this power.
97 MEDINA REPORT, supra note 5 at 28-29.
98 TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 18 at 98.
99 The author has argued that the "reasonable time" qualification of the Reardon Com-
mittee has expired. The Devitt Committee, however, stated that one of its future
tasks is:
[V]oluntary action by law enforcement agencies to ac-
quaint their personnel with the limitations of the stan-
dards .... [emphasis added]
(ADVISORY MANUAL, supra note 18 at 33) The Devitt Committee has recommended
that the trial adopt only those rules "applying to lawyers and court personnel." This
approach will eliminate any possible impact that the Reardon Standards might have
on police departments, removing the only pressure to act that could be placed on
these departments.
100 The courts might possibly induce cooperation of law enforcement officials by merely
declaring a mistrial whenever an enforcement official made a statement in violation of
the Approved Draft standards. Nonetheless, the Reardon Committee felt that the
only way to ensure effectively that police would withhold potentially prejudicial
statements was to use the enforcement power of the courts. See Section 2,2, App.
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D. Legislative Implementation of Reardon Standards
Only two bills regulating prejudicial dissemination appear to
have been introduced into either the federal or state legislatures.
Both were less extensive than the Reardon Standards and both
were rejected. The first was a Massachusetts House bill restric-
ting statements by court officers and certain statements by the
news media. 10 1 The other was a bill offered in the U.S. Senate by
former Senator Wayne Morse in 1965.102 Although the federal
bill had the support of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, it was shelved in committee and died an unnoticed death.
Public apathy toward criminal reform suggests that there will
be little effective pressure for legislative reform in this area. Only
the judiciary, which must deal with the problems of prejudice, is
likely to argue for enactment of the Standards, be it by statute or
by rule of court. On the other hand, the press could create
immediate and heated opposition to any attempt to legislatively
enact the Standards. The news media are suspicious of any legis-
lation in this area, and their probable opposition would perhaps
make it impolitic for legislators to take action. Indeed, media
opposition is likely to outweigh any demand for implementation at
the legislative level.
The failure of the above bills, the absence of other at-
tempts, and the probability of opposition by the media suggest
that neither the federal nor the state legislatures will be willing to
adopt the Reardon Standards.
Court adoption of the Reardon Standards is more likely. Re-
cent cases have indicated a growing judicial concern with protec-
tion of the integrity of the jury process and have indicated that the
courts must do more to ensure this integrity. As the Supreme
Court said in Sheppard v. Maxwell:
101 House Bill No. 3991 (Mass., 1965). This proposed bill was the subject of an advisory
opinion by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Opinion of the Justices, 349
Mass. 786 at 788, 208 N.E.2d. 240 (1965). The court held that the bill was within
legislative power; stating at 241-242:
Undoubtedly, the Legislature can provide safeguards to
ensure defendants in criminal cases the right to a fair and
impartial trial by jury.
See Signourney, Fair Trial and Free Press-A Proposed Solution, 51 MASS.' L.Q. 117
(1966).
10 2 See 290 89th Cong., 1st Sess., (1965).
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Given the pervasiveness of modern commu-
nications and the difficulty of effacing prej-
udicial publicity from the minds of the jurors,
the trial courts must take strong measures to
ensure that the balance is not weighed against
the accused .... The courts must take such
steps by rule and regulation that will protect
their processes from prejudicial outside inter-
ferences. 103 (Emphasis added)
Even if legislative action were likely, it is ultimately less desir-
able than court adoption. The courts could make necessary modi-
fications more quickly by rule of court than legislatures could by
statute. Nor are courts subject to the pressures of lobbyists urging
alteration of the Standards. Moreover, the courts have been tra-
ditionally responsible for the protection of constitutionally guar-
anteed rights. They should, therefore, be primarily responsible for
enforcement measures that directly affect the vitality of the Sixth
Amendment.
Finally, any legislative enactment would be a needless ex-
penditure of energy since the courts would ultimately have to
interpret and enforce the Reardon Standards. Adoption and en-
forcement of the Reardon Standards should be therefore left
primarily to the courts. 10 4
VI. Court Adoption and Enforcement of the Standards
A. Power to Adopt Procedural Standards
The courts clearly have the power to adopt and to utilize those
Reardon Standards which govern the application of procedural
remedies. 10 5 Recently, the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Pa-
triarca v. United States'0 6 and the Supreme Court of California in
Maine v. Superior Court of Medocina County10 7 adopted section
'
03 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-63.
104 The Devitt Committee also recommended that courts adopt and enforce the Standards.
The ADVISORY MANUAL, supra note 18, at 33.
105 These Standards are contained in Part Ill of the Reardon Standards, App. KAUFMANN
REPORT, supra note 5 stated at 17, "Finally it is clear that the court has the power
and the duty to regulate the conduct of a trial so as to insulate the proceedings from
prejudicial influences.
106 Patriarca v. United States, 402 F.2d 308 (1st Cir. 1968).




3.4 and section 3.2, respectively, of the Reardon Standards.
These courts assumed, without discussion, that they had power to
adopt these rules of procedure. Section 3.6, requiring a new trial
whenever there is a "substantial likelihood" of outside influence,
also seems to be within the ambit of the court's power.108 Indeed,
the Supreme Court of the United States has suggested that when a
massive and pervasive prejudicial publicity surrounds a trial, no
showing of actual prejudice is necessary to invalidate a conviction
of jurors drawn from a community exposed to such publicity. 10 9
B. Power to Regulate Release of Information
The extent to which a court may regulate the conduct of
individuals involved in the process of criminal prosecution is not
as clear. While the Supreme Court in Sheppard did say that the
trial court's power extended to "[lawyers], witnesses, court staff
[and] law enforcement officers coming under the jurisdiction of
the court,"'110 it did not specify the extent of this power. How-
ever, case analysis reveals that courts have considerable power to
regulate the activities of participants in the administration of
criminal justice.
1. Attorneys
Attorneys are clearly within the ambit of the court's power.
Court regulation of their conduct under Canon 20 has expressly
108 The test of "substantial likelihood" is in accord with case law. Recent cases have
affirmed the lower court's power to grant new trials without the showing of actual
prejudice. The Supreme Court has held that a denial of fair trial results: (I) where
inherently prejudicial publicity saturated the community and controlled the court-
room, Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra note 16; (2) where the proceedings were televised,
even though actual prejudice was not shown, Estes v. Louisiana, 381 U.S. 532
(1965); (3) where a change of venue was denied despite a locally televised confession,
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); (4) where jurors have read prejudicial
news accounts, Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959). The Tenth Circuit
has recently held that a new trial must be granted where a trial judge failed to
ascertain whether any jurors had been exposed to prejudicial newspaper publicity.
Mares v. United States, 383F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1967).
109 Id. Moreover, the failure to utilize court procedure to full advantage may constitute a
denial of due process, thereby giving the courts power to invalidate a conviction.
110 384 U.S. at 363 (1966).
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been approved by some state courts, and implicitly approved by
the Supreme Court in Sheppard.111 The Kaufman Report stated:
First, it (the committee) feels that each
United States District Court has the power
and the duty to control the release of prej-
udicial information by attorneys who are
members of the bar of that court. 11 2
A U.S. District Court in New Jersey recently announced a
six-fold prohibition which banned the release of public statements
by lawyers concerning the prior record of the accused, the exis-
tence or content of confessions, tests taken, the identity of wit-
nesses, pleas of guilty, and opinions of guilt.1 13 This is the most
detailed judicial categorization to date of the kind of restrictions
falling within the permissible scope of the "take steps" mandate
of the Supreme Court in Sheppard.11 4
2. Court officers
The Court in Sheppard assumed that a court's power to restrict
disclosure extends to court officers. 115 As mentioned above, how-
ever, the extent of this regulation was not made explicit.
The Kaufman Report stated:
... the committee believes that the court has
'"The Supreme Court of Minnesota in State v. Thompson, 139 N.W.2d 490 at 514, 273
Minn. I at 34-5, and a California Court of Appeals in County of Los Angeles v.
Superior Court, 253 Cal. App.3d 570, 687, 62 Cal. Rptr. 435, 446 (1967), have
explicitly approved this interpretation. The Supreme Court of New Jersey in State v.
Van Duyne, supra note 24 at 389, stated that Canon 20 was intended to:
ban all statements to news media by prosecutors ... and
their lawyer staff members, as to alleged confessions or
inculpatory admissions by the accused, or to the effect
that the case is "open and shut" against the defendant,
and the like, or with reference to the defendant's prior
criminal record, either of convictions or arrests. Such
statements have the capacity to interfere with a fair trial
and cannot be countenanced. the ban . . . applies as
well to defense attorneys."
43 N.J. at 389, 204 A.2d at 852. This holding has been approved in Sheppard v.
Maxwell, supra note 16, at 333.
112 KAUFMAN REPORT, supra note 2 at 17.
1134 CR1M. L. REV. 2314 (Jan. 15, 1969).
"
4 See text accompanying note supra 103.
15 More specifically, the trial court might well have prescribed extrajudicial statements by
a lawyer, party, witness, or court official, which divulged prejudicial mat-
ters ... [Emphasis added]. 384 U.S. at 361.
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a similar power and duty to prohibit prej-
udicial disclosures by courtroom personnel,
such as bailiffs, clerks, marshals and court
reporters. 116 [Emphasis added]
Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that the courts may
restrict statements of court employees to the same extent as those
of attorneys.
3. Police officers
There are compelling arguments for the proposition that the
court has the power to control statements of police officers con-
nected with the trial process. However, what little authority ex-
ists seems to suggest the contrary. In sustaining a first degree
murder conviction, the Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1 7 relying
on State v. Van Duyne,"l8 said that:
Police officers, over whom we have no
... disciplinary power, ought likewise to
be dealt with by their superior officers to the
end that criminal cases may be fairly tried in
court and not in the news media. 119
Though the Minnesota court suggested that it had no power to
regulate police, that is not exactly what was stated in the Van
Duyne decision. In reference to improper pre-trial releases by
police officers, the Van Duyne court stated that: "control of the
matter is largely in the hands of the prosecutor and local police
authorities."1 ' [Emphasis added] This statement seems to be a
mere suggestion that the logical department to regulate the police
is the police department. Moreover, since the Van Duyne court
was applying Canon 20, which was applicable solely to lawyers,
its failure to bind the police officers under that Canon was under-
standable.
116 KAUFMAN REPORT, supra note 5, at 17 .... [Elven within the most
restrictive statute [court employees] are plainly "officers
of the court," and unauthorized disclosures of informa-
tion threatening the fairness of an impending or ongoing
criminal trial would certainly appear to constitute "mis-
behavior" in the performance of an official function.
TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 2, at 110-1 IL.
117 State v. Thompson, 139 N.W.2d 490, 273 Minn. 1 (1966).
118 State v. Van Duyne, supra note 24, (43 N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841) (1964).
119 State v. Thompson, supra note 24 (273 139 N.W.2d at 514, Minn. at 35) (1966).
120 State v. Van Duyne, supra note 24 (43 N.J. at 389, 204 A.2d at 852) (1964).
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It was held in County of Los Angeles v. Superior C )urt for
County of Los Angeles 12 1 that a lower court did not have power
to enjoin the release of information by police officers during the
pre-arraignment period. The appellate court was not convinced
that such an injunction was always necessary to protect the rights
of a defendant:
... we cannot say that it is necessary to si-
lence the sources of pretrial publicity during
the prearraignment period in order to protect
the right of every defendant to a fair trial by
an impartial jury. Nor can we say that the
unrestricted release of information by
... any... peace officer during that period
about any person under arrest, standing
alone, will always result in a denial of con-
stitutional due process to any such person
and that all such conduct is therefore ille-
gal. 122 [Emphasis added]
The court relied heavily on the policy arguments of the Medina
Committee which suggested that no power existed to regulate
police in the pretrial period.
The prospect, in this pretrial period, of judges
of various criminal courts of high and low
degree sitting as petty tyrants, handing down
sentences of fine and imprisonment for con-
tempt of court against lawyers, policemen,
and reporters and editors, is not attractive.
Such an innovation might well cut prejudicial
publicity to a minimum. But at what a
price!123
The Los Angeles court's denial of the trial court's jurisdiction
over police may rest on the appellate court's implicit distaste for
the breadth of the lower court's order which was identical to a
substantial portion of section 2.1 of the Reardon Standards. 12 4
There are strong arguments in favor of the validity of the
exercise of power by the court over officers involved in matters
relating to the trial process. If the courts, by reversals, have the
power to indirectly oversee police treatment of the defendant in
121 Supra note 80 (253 Cal. App. 670, 62 Cal. Rptr. 435) (1967).
122 Id., at 445-446.
123 Id., at 448, quoting from the MEDINA REPORT supra note 2, at 39-40.
124 62 Cal. Rptr. at 438-439.
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order to protect his Fifth Amendment rights, they should also
have the power to supervise statements made by enforcement
officers to ensure the defendant's right to a fair trial under the
Sixth Amendment. The need for the courts to ensure the defend-
ant's rights is greater under the Sixth Amendment. A defendant
can always attempt to remain silent; but the defendant can never
prevent the police from publicly releasing information prejudicial
to his interests.
Moreover, the Los Angeles decision's "departmentalized" view
seems to be too rigid. The "separation of powers" doctrine does
not preclude the court from restricting enforcement officers:
The concept of separation of powers is not
one that necessitates rigid and simplistic cate-
gorization of every aspect of government;
rather it is one that reflects concern over the
assumption by one arm of government of the
whole function of another branch. Within the
basic framework of checks and balances, it
permits areas of overlap and concurrent au-
thority.125
The author therefore suggests that the police be deemed
"officers of the court" during the course of formal investigation.
The court would then have the power, subject to precisely defined
rules, to regulate news disclosures by these policemen. The au-
thority of Los Angeles and Thompson is therefore of little prac-
tical effect, especially since Los Angeles seems to have mis-
interpreted the Reardon Standards. 126
If the intentional disseminator is a lawyer or courtroom em-
ployee, he will clearly fall within the court's regulatory power. 127
125 TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 2, at 102.
126 The court in Los Angeles stated that the position of Reardon Committee was:
that effective measures to control the release of such
information by law enforcement officers can and should
only come through the adoption and enforcement of ap-
propriate regulations by such agencies. County of Los
Angeles v. Superior Court, supra note 80 (62 Cal. Rptr.
at 448).
This interpretation is erroneous in an important respect. The committee concedes the
enforcement agencies a "reasonable time" in which to adopt regulations themselves.
The committee is ready, nevertheless, to urge court regulation in the event that the
agencies do not take voluntary action within that time period. See section 2.2, App.
As the author has suggested, this period has elapsed. See text accompanying notes
92-99 supra.
12 7 See discussion in text, accompanying notes 110-117, supra.
f[Vol. 3:1
Reardon Standards
However, the individual may be a newspaper editor, reporter, or
even the mayor of a large city. In these situations, the power of
the court is again unclear. The impact of the intentional dis-
seminator's conduct on the processes of the court, however, can
be so severe that the use of the contempt power as described in
the Reardon standards would be justified. 128
C. Implementation of the Reardon Standards
Although the courts can adopt the Standards by either the case
method or by rule of court, the latter method seems to be more
appropriate. The Reardon Committee stressed the need for a total
approach, encompassing all participants in the process of criminal
prosecution. The Committee argued that to bind only one group is
worse than to do nothing. 129 Accordingly, use of the case method,
with its inherently limited approach, would not assure the total
solution that the Committee believed necessary. Only by using
the rule of court method can the total approach be achieved
with the requisite swiftness to assure full compliance by all
affected individuals. Yet the Standards would nevertheless retain
that flexibility necessary to ensure equitable application on a
case-by-case basis.
The Standards must be adopted by appellate courts. Although,
128 The very nature of section 4 indicates that contempt sanctions would be applied in
only the most egregious circumstances. There must be a jury trial in progress and the
person must know that it is in progress. The person must disseminate the statement
or know that it will be publically disseminated. Finally, the statement must be
"reasonably calculated," to affect the outcome of the trial. "It must, in other words,
have been a statement that was actually intended to affect the outcome or that was so
likely to have such an effect that the person making it could only have acted in
reckless disregard of the consequences." And there must be a clear and present
danger that would occur. TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 2, at 152. It must be
realized that in some jurisdictions the power of contempt is limited by statute. As the
KAUFMAN REPORT, supra note 2 at 19, states, "Apart from constitutional inhibitions,
the power of a federal court to punish for contempt by publication is presently limited
by federal criminal contempt statute to misbehavior of any person in its presence or
so near thereto as to obstruct the administration ofjustice, ( 18 U.S.C. 40 1(]) (1964)
and to disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, degree or
command. 18 U.S.C. 401(3) (1964). In Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941), the
Supreme Court ruled that the power conferred by the first portion of this statute is
restricted to the immediate geographical vicinity of the courtroom. 18 U.S.C. 401 (2)
authorizes federal courts to punish by contempt misbehavior of its officers in the
course of their official functions. Even in the absence of this statute, the Reardon
Committee has pointed out that use of contempt against courtroom employees has
generally been upheld." See TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 2, at 110.
129 Transcript, supra note 4, at 157.
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as a policy matter, all courts should adopt and enforce the Stan-
dards, there are several reasons for emphasizing adoption at the
appellate level. First, the trial courts may feel that they lack the
power to regulate certain groups to which the Standards are
addressed. As a result, such courts will be reluctant to enforce
those Standards. This would be especially true in those jurisdic-
tions in which the Standards go beyond the restrictions already
established by case law, or where the courts feel that the Stan-
dards raise serious constitutional questions. Second, even if the
trial courts should feel that they do have the power to enforce the
Standards against the persons in question, it seems likely that
there would be those trial judges who would nonetheless be
reluctant to so enforce them.' 30 This seems particularly true in
light of the past failure of many trial judges to enforce Canon
20.131
Moreover, there are several reasons why adoption by an appel-
late court is easier, and therefore more desirable, than adoption
by the trial courts. Adoption on the appellate level would increase
pressure on the trial judge to enforce the Standards. Failure to
apply them might be viewed as a denial of due process in-
validating a conviction. 132 The threat of reversal would, in most
cases, help ensure compliance with the Standards. In those cases
where compliance was not found, such failure could provide
sufficient grounds for reversal without the need for any finding of
actual prejudice. 33
Of course, the trial courts and the various groups involved
should nonetheless act on their own initiative. There is a very real
need for the combined efforts of all courts to ensure effective
application of the Reardon Standards. But the significant substan-
tive safeguards of the Reardon Standards will not prove effective
unless the courts, particularly the appellate courts, adopt and
enforce them.
VII. Conclusion
The Reardon Standards offer a viable approach to protection of
130TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 2, at 74.
131 See note 24 supra.
13 2 See note 51 supra.
133 See note 108 supra.
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the defendant's guarantee of a trial by an "impartial jury." The
Standards ensure that the defendant will be tried in the court-
room, and not "condemned in the market place of public opin-
ion." Interpreted as minimum standards, and implemented in toto
by appellate courts, the Standards will reduce leakage and dis-
semination of prejudicial publicity and will minimize its influence
on the trial process. At the same time, the Standards will not
abridge freedom of speech; they will not prevent the media from
exposing judicial corruption or issuing timely public warnings.
The standards both balance and preserve the right to a fair trial
and the right of free press.
With the enormous growth of the mass media, the problem of
guaranteeing the defendant a fair trial in the face of prejudicial
publicity is of increasing concern. Time dictates immediate imple-
mentation of the Reardon Standards. "We tend to agree with the
Bard who in HENRY VI observed, 'Delays have dangerous
ends.' "134
1
34 Judge Reardon closing remarks to A.B.A. House of Delegates arguing for adoption of




REARDON STANDARDS, AS APPROVED BY THE A.B.A.
HOUSE OF DELEGATES
PART i. RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO THE CONDUCT
OF ATTORNEYS IN CRIMINAL CASES
1.1 Revision of the Canons of Professional Ethics.
It is recommended that the substance of the following standards, relating to public
discussion of pending or imminent criminal litigation, be embodied in the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility:
It is the duty of the lawyer not to release or authorize the release of information or
opinion for dissemination by any means of public communication, in connection with
pending or imminent criminal litigation with which he is associated, if there is a reasonable
likelihood that such dissemination will interfere with a fair trial or otherwise prejudice the
due administration of justice.
With respect to a grand jury or other pending investigation of any criminal matter, a
lawyer participating in the investigation shall refrain from making any extrajudicial state-
ment, for dissemination by any means of public communication, that goes beyond the
public record or that is not necessary to inform the public that the investigation is
underway, to describe the general scope of the investigation, to obtain assistance in the
apprehension of a suspect, to warn the public of any dangers, or otherwise to aid in the
investigation.
From the time of arrest, issuance of an arrest warrant, or filing of a complaint, informa-
tion, or indictment in any criminal matter until the commencement of trial or disposition
without trial, a lawyer associated with the prosecution or defense shall not release or
authorize the release of any extrajudicial statement, for dissemination by any means of
public communication, relating to that matter and concerning:
(1) The prior criminal record (including arrests, indictments, or other charges of crime),
or the character or reputation of the accused, except that the lawyer may make a
factual statement of the accused's name, age, residence, occupation, and family status,
and if the accused has not been apprehended, a lawyer associated with the prosecution
may release any information necessary to aid in his apprehension or to warn the public
of any dangers he may present;
(2) The existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by the
accused, or the refusal or failure of the accused to make any statement;
(3) The performance of any examinations or tests or the accused's refusal or failure to
submit to an examination or test;
(4) The identity, testimony, or credibility of prospective witnesses, except that the
lawyer may announce the identity of the victim if the announcement is not otherwise
prohibited by law;
(5) The possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense charged or a lesser offense;
(6) Any opinion as to the accused's guilt or innocence or as to the merits of the case or
the evidence in the case.
The foregoing shall not be construed to preclude the lawyer during this period, in the
proper discharge of his official or professional obligations, from announcing the fact and
circumstances of arrest (including time and place of arrest, resistance, pursuit, and use of
weapons), the identity of the investigating and arresting officer or agency, and the length of
the investigation; from making an announcement, at the time of seizure of any physical
evidence other than a confession, admission or statement, which is limited to a description
of the evidence seized; from disclosing the nature, substance, or text of the charge,
including a brief description of the offense charged; from quoting or referring without
comment to public records of the court in the case; from announcing the scheduling or
result of any stage in the judicial process; from requesting assistance in obtaining evidence;
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or from announcing without further comment that the accused denies the charges made
against him.
During the trial of any criminal matter, including the period of selection of the jury, no
lawyer associated with the prosecution or defense shall give or authorize any extrajudicial
statement or interview, relating to the trial or the parties or issues in the trial, for
dissemination by any means of public communication, except that the lawyer may quote
from or refer without comment to public records of the court in the case.
After the completion of a trial or disposition without trial of any criminal matter, and
prior to the imposition of sentence, a lawyer associated with the prosecution or defense
shall refrain from making or authorizing any extrajudicial statement for dissemination by
any means of public communication if there is a reasonable likelihood that such dis-
semination will affect the imposition of sentence.
Nothing in this Canon is intended to preclude the formulation or application of more
restrictive rules relating to the release of information about juvenile or other offenders, to
preclude the holding of hearings or the lawful issuance of reports by legislative, adminis-
trative, or investigative bodies, or to preclude any lawyer from replying to charges of
misconduct that are publicly made against him.
1.2 Rule of court.
In any jurisdiction in which Canons of Professional Ethics have not been adopted by
statute or court rule, it is recommended that the substance of the foregoing section be
adopted as a rule of court governing the conduct of attorneys.
1.3 Enforcement.
It is recommended that violation of the standards set forth in section 1.1 shall be
grounds for judicial and bar association reprimand or for suspension from practice and, in
more serious cases, for disbarment. It is further recommended that any attorney or bar
association be allowed to petition an appropriate court for the institution of disciplinary
proceedings, and that the court have discretion to initiate such proceedings, either on the
basis of such a petition or on its own motion.
PART II. RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO THE CONDUCT
OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, JUDGES, AND JUDICIAL
EMPLOYEES IN CRIMINAL CASES
2.1 Departmental rules.
It is recommended that law enforcement agencies in each jurisdiction adopt the follow-
ing internal regulations:
(a) A regulation governing the release of information, relating to the commission of
crimes and to their investigation, prior to the making of an arrest, issuance of an arrest
warrant, or the filing of formal charges. This regulation should establish appropriate
procedures for the release of information. It should further provide that, when a crime is
believed to have been committed, pertinent facts relating to the crime itself and to
investigative procedures may properly be made available but the identity of a suspect prior
to arrest and the results of investigative procedures shall not be disclosed except to the
extent necessary to aid in the investigation, to assist in the apprehension of the suspect, or
to warn the public of any dangers.
(b) A regulation prohibiting (i) the deliberate posing of a person in custody for photo-
graphing or televising by representatives of the news media and (ii) the interviewing by
representatives of the news media of a person in custody unless, in writing, he requests or
consents to an interview after being adequately informed of his right to consult with
counsel and of his right to refuse to grant an interview.
(c) A regulation providing:
Prospectus
From the time of arrest, issuance of an arrest warrant, or the filing of any complaint,
information, or indictment in any criminal matter, until the completion of trial or dis-
position without trial, no law enforcement officer within this agency shall release or
authorize the release of any extrajudicial statement, for dissemination by any means of
public communication, relating to that matter and concerning:
(1) The prior criminal record (including arrests, indictments, or other charges of crime),
or the character or reputation of the accused, except that the officer may make a factual
statement of the accused's name, age, residence, occupation, and family status, and if
the accused has not been apprehended, may release any information necessary to aid in
his apprehension or to warn the public of any dangers he may present;
(2) The existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by the
accused, or the refusal or failure of the accused to make any statement, except that the
officer may announce without further comment that the accused denies the charges
made against him;
(3) The performance of any examinations or tests or the accused's refusal or failure to
submit to an examination or test;
(4) The identity, testimony, or credibility of prospective witnesses, except that the
officer may announce the identity of the victim if the announcement is not otherwise
prohibited by law;
(5) The possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense charged or a lesser offense;
(6) Any opinion as to the accused's guilt or innocence or as to the merits of the case or
the evidence in the case.
It shall be appropriate during this period for a law enforcement officer:
(1) to announce the fact and circumstances of arrest, including the time and place of
arrest, resistance, pursuit, and use of weapons;
(2) to announce the identity of the investigating and arresting officer or agency and the
length of the investigation;
(3) to make an announcement, at the time of seizure of any physical evidence other
than a confession, admission, or statement, which is limited to a description of the
evidence seized;
(4) to disclose the nature, substance, or text of the charge, including a brief description
of the offense charged;
(5) to quote from or refer without comment to public records of the court in the case;
(6) to announce the scheduling or result of any stage in the judicial process;
(7) to request assistance in obtaining evidence.
Nothing in this rule precludes any law enforcement officer from replying to charges of
misconduct that are publicly made against him, precludes any law enforcement officer from
participating in any legislative, administrative, or investigative hearing, or supersedes any
more restrictive rule governing the release of information concerning juvenile or other
offenders.
(d) A regulation providing for the enforcement of the foregoing by the imposition of
appropriate disciplinary sanctions.
2.2 Rule of court or legislation relating to law enforcement agencies.
It is recommended that if within a reasonable time a law enforcement agency in any
jurisdiction fails to adopt and adhere to the substance of the regulation recommended in
section 2.1 (c), as it relates to both proper and improper disclosures, the regulation be made
effective with respect to that agency by rule of court or by legislative action, with
appropriate sanctions for violation.
2.3 Rule of court relating to disclosures by judicial employees.
It is recommended that a rule of court be adopted in each jurisdiction prohibiting any
judicial employee from disclosing, to any unauthorized person, information relating to a
pending criminal case that is not part of the public records of the court and that may tend
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to interfere with the right of the people or of the defendant to a fair trial. Particular
reference should be made in this rule to the nature and result of any argument or hearing
held in chambers or otherwise outside the presence of the public and not yet available to
the public under the standards in section 3.1 and section 3.5(d) of these recommendations.
Appropriate discipline, including proceedings for contempt, should be provided for in-
fractions of this rule.
2.4 Recommendations relating to judges.
It is recommended that, with respect to pending criminal cases, judges should refrain
from any conduct or the making of any statements that may tend to interfere with the right
of the people or of the defendant to a fair trial.
PART III. RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO THE CONDUCT
OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN CRIMINAL CASES
3.1 Pretrial hearings.
It is recommended that the following rule be adopted in each jurisdiction by the
appropriate court:
Motion to exclude public from all or part of pretrial hearing.
In any preliminary hearing, bail hearing, or other pretrial hearing in a criminal case,
including a motion to suppress evidence, the defendant may move that all or part of the
hearing be held in chambers or otherwise closed to the public, including representatives of
the news media, on the ground that dissemination of evidence or argument adduced at the
hearing may disclose matters that will be inadmissible in evidence at the trial and is
therefore likely to interfere with his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. The motion
shall be granted unless the presiding officer determines that there is no substantial likeli-
hood of such interference. With the consent of the defendant, the presiding officer may
take such action on his own motion or at the suggestion of the prosecution. Whenever
under this rule all or part of any pretrial hearing is held in chambers or otherwise closed to
the public, a complete record of the proceedings shall be keot and shall be made available
to the public following the completion of trial or disposition of the case without trial.
Nothing in this rule is intended to interfere with the power of the presiding officer in any
pretrial hearing to caution those present that dissemination of certain information by any
means of public communication may jeopardize the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.
3.2 Changes of venue or continuance.
It is recommended that the following standards be adopted in each jurisdiction to govern
the consideration and disposition of a motion in a criminal case for change of venue or
continuance based on a claim of threatened interference with the right to a fair trial.
(a) Who may request.
Except as federal or state constitutional provisions otherwise require, a change of venue
or continuance may be granted on motion of either the prosecution or the defense.
(b) Methods of proof.
In addition to the testimony of affidavits of individuals in the community, which shall
not be required as a condition of the granting of a motion for change of venue or
continuance, qualified public opinion surveys shall be admissible as well as other materials
having probative value.
(c) Standards for granting motion.
A motion for change of venue or continuance shall be granted whenever it is determined
that because of the dissemination of potentially prejudicial material, there is a reasonable
likelihood that in the absence of such relief, a fair-trial cannot be had. This determination
may be based on such evidence as qualified public opinion surveys or opinion testimony
offered by individuals, or on the court's own evaluation of the nature, frequency, and
timing of the material involved. A showing of actual prejudice shall not be required.
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(d) Same; time of disposition.
If a motion for change of venue or continuance is made prior to the impaneling of the
jury, the motion shall be disposed of before impaneling. If such a motion is permitted to be
made, or if reconsideration or review of a prior denial is sought, after the jury has been
selected, the fact that a jury satisfying prevailing standards of acceptability has been
selected shall not be controlling if the record shows that the criterion for the granting of
relief set forth in subsection (c) has been met.
(e) Limitations; waiver.
It shall not be a ground for denial of a change of venue that one such change has already
been granted. The claim that the venue should have been changed or a continuance
granted shall not be considered to have been waived by the waiver of the right to trial by
jury or by the failure to exercise all available preemptory challenges.
3.3 Waiver of jury.
In those jurisdictions in which the defendant does not have an absolute right to waive a
jury in a criminal case, it is recommended that the defendant be permitted to waive
whenever it is determined that (1) the waiver has been knowingly and voluntarily made,
and (2) there is reason to believe that, as a result of the dissemination of potentially
prejudicial material, the waiver is required to increase the likelihood of a fair trial.
3.4 Selecting the jury.
It is recommended that the following standards be adopted in each jurisdiction to govern
the selection of a jury in those criminal cases in which questions of possible prejudice are
raised.
(a) Method of examination.
Whenever there is believed to be a significant possibility that individual talesmen will be
ineligible to serve because of exposure to potentially prejudicial material, the examination
of each juror with respect to his exposure shall take place outside the presence of other
chosen and prospective jurors. An accurate record of this examination shall be kept, by
court reporter or tape recording whenever possible. The questioning shall be conducted for
the purpose of determining what the prospective juror has read and heard about the case
and how his exposure has affected his attitude towards the trial, not to convince him that
he would be derelict in his duty if he could not cast aside any preconceptions he might
have.
(b) Standard of acceptability.
Both the degree of exposure and the prospective juror's testimony as to his state of mind
are relevant to the determination of acceptability. A prospective juror who states that he
will be unable to overcome his preconceptions shall be subject to challenge for cause no
matter how slight his exposure. If he has seen or heard and remembers information that
will be developed in the course of trial, or that may be inadmissible but is not so prejudicial
as to create a substantial risk that his judgment will be affected, his acceptability shall turn
on whether his testimony as to impartiality is believed. If he admits to having formed an
opinion, he shaU be subject to challenge for cause unless the examination shows unequiv-
ocally that he can be impartial. A prospective juror who has been exposed to and
remembers reports of highly significant information, such as the existence or contents of a
confession, or other incriminating matters that may be inadmissible in evidence, or
substantial amounts of inflammatory material, shall be subject to challenge for cause
without regard to his testimony as to his state of mind.
(c) Source of the panel.
Whenever it is determined that potentially prejudicial news coverage of a given criminal
matter has been intense and has been concentrated primarily in a given locality in a state
(or federal district), the court shall have authority to draw jurors from other localities in
that state (or district).
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3.5 Conduct of the trial.
It is recommended that the following standards be adopted in each jurisdiction to govern
the conduct of a criminal trial when problems relating to the dissemination of potentially
prejudicial material are raised.
(a) Use of the courtroom.
Whenever appropriate in view of the notoriety of the case or the number or conduct of
news media representatives present at any judicial proceeding, the court shall ensure the
preservation of decorum by instructing those representatives and others as to the per-
missible use of the courtroom and other facilities of the court, the assignment of seats to
news media representatives on an equitable basis, and other matters that may affect the
conduct of the proceeding.
(b) Sequestration of jury.
Either party shall be permitted to move for sequestration of the jury at the beginning of
trial or at any time during the course of the trial, and, in appropriate circumstances, the
court shall order sequestration on its own motion. Sequestration shall be ordered if it is
determined that the case is of such notoriety or the issues are of such a nature that, in the
absence of sequestration, highly prejudicial matters are likely to come to the attention of
the jurors. Whenever sequestration is ordered, the court in advising the jury of the decision
shall not disclose which party requested sequestration.
(c) Cautioning parties, witnesses, jurors, and judicial employees; insulating witnesses.
Whenever appropriate in light of the issues in the case or the notoriety of the case, the
court shall instruct parties, witnesses, jurors, and employees and officers of the court not to
make extrajudicial statements, relating to the case or the issues in the case, for dis-
semination by any means of public communications during the course of the trial. The
court may also order sequestration of witnesses, prior to their appearance, when it appears
likely that in the absence of sequestration they will be exposed to extrajudicial reports that
may influence their testimony.
(d) Exclusion of the public from hearings or arguments outside the presence of the jury.
If the jury is not sequestered, the defendant shall be permitted to move that the public,
including representatives of the news media, be excluded from any portion of the trial that
takes place outside the presence of the jury on the ground that dissemination of evidence
or argument adduced at the hearing is likely to interfere with the defendant's right to a fair
trial by an impartial jury. The motion shall be granted unless it is determined that there is
no substantial likelihood of such interference. With the consent of the defendant, the court
may take such action on its own motion or at the suggestion of the prosecution. Whenever
such action is taken, a complete record of the proceedings from which the public has been
excluded shall be kept and shall be made available to the public following the completion
of the trial. Nothing in this recommendation is intended to interfere with the power of the
court, in connection with any hearing held outside the presence of the jury, to caution
those present that dissemination of specified information by any means of public commu-
nication, prior to the rendering of the verdict, may jeopardize the right to a fair trial by iin
impartial jury.
(e) Cautioning jurors.
In any case that appears likely to be of significant public interest, an admonition in
substantially the following form shall be given before the end of the first day if the jury is
not sequestered.
During the time you serve on this jury, there may appear in the newspapers or on radio
or television reports concerning this case, and you may be tempted to read, listen to, or
watch them. Please do not do so. Due process of law requires that the evidence to be
considered by you in reaching your verdict meet certain standards-for example, a
witness may testify about events he himself has seen or heard but not about matters of
which he was told by others. Also, witnesses must be sworn to tell the truth and must
be subject to cross-examination. News reports about the case are not subject to these
standards, and if you read, listen to, or watch these reports, you may be exposed to
misleading or inaccurate information which unduly favors one side and to which the
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other side is unable to respond. In fairness to both sides, therefore, it is essential that
you comply with this instruction.
If the process of selecting a jury is a lengthy one, such an admonition shall also be given to
each juror as he is selected. At the end of each subsequent day of the trial, and at other
recess periods if the court deems necessary, an admonition in substantially the following
form shall be given:
For the reasons stated earlier in the trial, I must remind you not to read, listen to, or
watch any news reports concerning this case while you are serving on this jury.
(f) Questioning jurors about exposure to potentially prejudicial material in the course of the
trial; standard for excusing a juror.
If it is determined that material disseminated during the trial goes beyond the record on
which the case is to be submitted to the jury and raises serious questions of possible
prejudice, the court may on its own motion or shall on motion of either party question each
juror, out of the presence of the others, about his exposure to that material. The exam-
ination shall take place in the presence of counsel, and an accurate record of the exam-
ination shall be kept. The standard for excusing a juror who is challenged on the basis of
such exposure shall be the same as the standard of acceptability recommended in section
3.4(b), above, except that a juror who has seen or heard reports of potentially prejudicial
material shall be excused if reference to the material in question at the trial itself would
have required a mistrial to be declared.
3.6 Setting aside the verdict.
It is recommended that, on motion of the defendant, a verdict of guilty in any criminal
case be set aside and a new trial granted whenever, on the basis of competent evidence,
the court finds a substantial likelihood that the vote of one or more jurors was influenced
by exposure to an extrajudicial communication of any matter relating to the defendant or
to the case itself that was not part of the trial record on which the case was submitted to
the jury. Nothing in this recommendation is intended to affect the rule in any jurisdiction
as to whether and in what circumstances a juror may impeach his own verdict or as to
what other evidence is competent for that purpose.
PART IV. RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO THE EXERCISE OF
THE CONTEMPT POWER
4.1 Limited use of the contempt power.
It is recommended that the contempt power should be used only with considerable
caution but should be exercised under the following circumstances:
(a) Against a person who, knowing that a criminal trial by jury is in progress or that a
jury is being selected for such a trial:
(i) disseminates by any means of public communication an extrajudicial statement
relating to the defendant or to the issues in the case that goes beyond the public record
of the court in the case, that is willfully designed by that person to affect the outcome of
the trial, and that seriously threatens to have such an effect; or
(ii) makes such a statement intending that it be disseminated by any means of public
communications.
(b) Against a person who knowingly violates a valid judicial order not to disseminate,
until completion of the trial or disposition without trial, specified information referred to in
the course of a judicial hearing closed pursuant to sections 3.1 or 3.5(d) of these recom-
mendations.
